These bodily members are, as it were, no more than garments; which, because they have been attached to us for a long time, we think are us, or parts of us [and] the cause of this is the long period of adherence: we are accustomed to remove clothes and to throw them down, which we are entirely unaccustomed to do with our bodily members i . Avicenna, De Anima V.7
As interface, the skin is obsolete…The clothing of the body with membranes embedded with alternate sensory and input/output devices creates the possibility of more intimate and enhanced interactivity. Subjectively, the body experiences itself as a more extruded system, rather than an enclosed structure. The self becomes situated beyond the skin ii . Stelarc, Parasite Visions Abstract/Introduction and recruit them into temporary problem-solving wholes. Neural plasticity, exaggerated in our own species, makes it possible for such resources to become factored deep into both our cognitive and physical problem-solving routines. One way to think about this is to depict the biological brain as a master of what I shall dub 'ecological control'. Ecological control is the kind of top-level control that does not micro-manage every detail, but rather encourages substantial devolvement of power and responsibility. This kind of control allows much of our skill at walking to reside in the linkages and elastic properties of muscles and tendons. And it allows (I claim) much of our prowess at thought and reason to depend upon the robust and reliable operation, often (but not always) in dense brain-involving loops, of a variety of non-biological problem-solving resources spread throughout our social and technological surround.
Are the complex distributed systems that result in some sense 'out of control', beyond the reach of useful (you might even, though problematically, say, 'personal') governance? I shall argue that they are not, although understanding them requires us to re-think some key ideas about control and the nature of the self. To (try to) make this case, I shall first examine some strategies for efficient, external opportunity exploiting control in simple systems. I shall then argue that many of the same lessons apply to the case of higher-level human problem-solving.
Ecological Control
Consider Shakey. Shakey, circa 1970, was the mobile robotic darling of the Stanford Research Institute: one of the very first computercontrolled mobile robots and a locus of hard (non-ecological) control.
Armed with a camera, wheels, and a laser range-finder, and controlled by a big old mainframe whizzing along at 1/4 million calculations per second, Shakey could obey typed commands such as "Push the cube to the pyramid". To do so, the system would sense, process, plan, and then act out its plan. For Shakey, the body and the environment were first and foremost problems to be solved.
The environment was the problem arena. The sensors detected the lay-out in that arena and the reasoning system planned a solution. To a large degree, Shakey's body was just another part of the problem space: a part that needed to be sent detailed, micro-managing control signals so as to put the reasoned-out solution into practice. A contemporary analogue, though vastly faster and more sophisticated, is Honda's Asimo. Asimo is a mainstream control paradigm walking robot that uses precise joint-angle control to mimic human walking.
The solution looks pretty good but is massively energy and computation expensive.
Contrast these solutions with the kinds of ecological control deployed by Passive Dynamic Walkers
iii (PDW's) Passive Dynamic Walkers are simple-looking two-legged devices that employ no actuation except gravity, have no control system as such, and (as a result) can enforce no joint angle control at any time. Yet surprisingly, PDW's are capable (when set on a gentle incline) of very stable, human-looking walking. Now imagine that you (playing evolution) want to exploit that kind of surprising capacity but in the context of a self-powered locomoting agent. The solution, which looks to be Nature's own, is to walk using a kind of controlled falling-over. Powered (level terrain) walking can thus be brought about by the brain and CNS systematically pushing, damping and tweaking a system in which Passive Dynamic effects continue to play a very major role. In such cases, a low energy source, a simple control system, and the body (and gravity!) 'collaborate' to solve the walking problem. This strategy has recently been implemented in a variety of simple robots (see Collins et al (2005) ) and described as "a new design and control paradigm' for walking robots (op cit p.1083). As a second example, has given us 'Robotoddler'. Robotoddler uses actorcritic reinforcement learning to acquire a control policy that exploits the passive dynamics of the body. The robot learns to change speeds and to go forward and backward, and can adapt on the go to different terrains, including bricks, wooden tiles, carpet and a variable speed treadmill. By using passive dynamic strategies, the robot's power consumption is dramatically reduced (to about 1/10th that of a standard robot like Honda's Asimo).
These examples serve to introduce the notion of soft or 'ecological'
control. This is the kind of control that occurs when a system's goals are not achieved by micro-managing every detail of the desired action or response, but by using a strategy that devolves a great deal of problem-solving responsibility, making the most of some robust, reliable source of relevant order in the body, elsewhere in the brain and/or in local environment (notice that 'ecological control' thus names a type of effect not a single mechanism).
The effect of an ecological control strategy is often (though not always) the soft-assembly of a solution. Ecological controllers that can learn on-the-go promote soft-assembled solutions, that is to say solutions that comprise a temporarily stable assembly of factors and forces recruited from whatever happens to be available. Soft assembly itself is a notion developed in movement science according to which:
"Movements can be seen as 'softly-assembled' patterns created and dissolved as tasks and environments change, with some patterns easy and preferred, and others more difficult and unstable… Moreover, as these synergies are assembled, they also take advantage of the non-neural aspects of movement:
effects of gravity, elastic properties of muscles and inertial effects" Thelen and Bates (2003) Clark and Chalmers (1998) ).
A helpful, though at best partial, parallel is with the way our sense of 'seeing the whole visual scene before us' depends, on some contemporary models, upon the way information that is not currently represented in conscious visual awareness, and that is 'stored' only in the external scene itself is nonetheless (thereby) poised for easy access by a simple saccade. That poise-for-easy-retrieval is taken for granted in our daily planning and acting, and may be the source of our feeling that we see detail and color throughout the whole of the visual field (for discussion, see Clark (2002a) , Noe (2002) ).
This is not to say that there are no interesting differences. with which are so familiar and fluent that we do not think about it in use, but rather rely on it to mediate our encounters with a still-wider world. Easy access to specific bodies of information, as and when such access is normally required, is all it takes for us to factor such knowledge in as part of the bundle of skills and abilities that we take for granted in our day to day life. And it is this bundle of 'taken-forgranted' skills, knowledge and abilities that -or so I am suggestingquite properly structures and informs our sense of who we are, what
we know, and what we can do.
The Shrinking Chooser
If this still feels unnatural, it is largely (I suggest) because we have in any case only the most tenuous collective grip on what it means to be a choosing, acting 'self', or a unified 'mind', and because we suffer from a chronic tendency to misconstrue the relations between our self-conscious "choosings" and the vast webs of non-conscious processing activity (all those whirrings and grindings of machinery, neural and perhaps non-neural, internal and perhaps external) that also structure and determine our own actions and responses. Until we form a better, more consistent image of the relationship between these factors, we cannot hope to know ourselves. We cannot, it seems, afford to identify ourselves with the conscious contents of momentary time-slices. With this in mind Dennett (2003) responds to worries (Libet (1985 (Libet ( ) (1999 ) concerning the time-lag between onset of action and conscious awareness of a decision by noting that:
"Our free will, like all our other mental powers, has to be smeared out over time, not measured at instants. Once you distribute the work done…in both space and time in the brain, you have to distribute the moral agency around as well. You are not out of the loop; you are the loop"
Dennett (2003) p. 242
Taking the whole loop of temporally and spatially spread cognitive activity seriously is, however, already to take the crucial step towards understanding ourselves as ecological control systems capable of incorporating external structures deep into their cognitive routines.
For the choices before us are now relatively stark:
Either, treat the mind and self as nothing but the shifting set of momentary 'conscious' contents (thus shrinking mind and self beyond recognition) Or, allow mind and self to depend upon the ongoing coordinated activity of multiple temporally spread conscious and non-conscious processes, thus inviting us to also consider certain non-biological members of the class of non-conscious processes to contribute as deeply to the mechanical underpinnings of our minds and selves as do the non-conscious neural processes.
The challenge, in other words, is this. Given the profound role of nonconscious, opportunistically recruited neural resources in the intentional origination of action, show us why (apart from some unargued prejudice) the machinery of mind and self should be restricted to the neural, the inner, or the biological. We need to seriously question the idea that neural, inner and/or biological goings-on are in some way incredibly special. We need to rid ourselves of the idea that our brains are somehow touched with the magic dust that makes them suitable to act as the physical machinery of mind and self, while the non-biological stuff must forever remain mere slave and tool. The relations between our conscious sense of self (our explicit plans and projects, and our sense of our own personality, capacities, bodily form, location and limits) and the many non-conscious neural goingson that structure and inform this cognitive profile are, it seems to me, pretty much on a par with the relations between our conscious minds and various kinds of transparent, reliable, robust and readily accessed non-biological resource. When those resources are of a recognisably knowledge-and-information based kind, the upshot is an extended cognitive system: a bio-technologically hybrid mind, a biotechnologically hybrid self. Milner and Goodale (1995) .
For a more balanced account, see Jacobs and Jeannerod (2003)). In a similar way, it is the non-conscious use of visual information that is responsible for many of our fine postural corrections and compensations (standing up while riding a bus, for example).
Even in the case of our own biological brains, then, the conscious self is in (direct, micro-managing) control of much less than we think. Not just the "autonomic" functions (breathing, heart-beat, etc.) but all kinds of human activities turn out to be partly supported by quasiindependent non-conscious sub-systems. This is no surprise, I am sure, to any sports player: it doesn't even seem, when playing a fast game of squash, as if your conscious perception of the ball is, moment-by-moment, guiding your hand and racket. Nor should it come as a surprise to artists and scientists, who are often painfully aware that the bulk of their own (intentional, owned, self-expressing) creative activity flows from subterranean and non-conscious sources.
What seems to matter, for our daily sense of effective agency and choice, is (i) that the conscious mind has a rough and fallible sense of what she (the embodied, embedded, perhaps technologically extended, agent) knows, wants, and can and can't do, and (ii) that sometimes at least, conscious rehearsal can be an active part of the process that leads, within that complex economy, to intentional action. The conscious contribution here need amount to no more than a gentle but subjectively experienced nudge that tips the balance of a complex, and to a large extent unconsciously self-organizing, system. when all this is working properly: a more-or-less rational being pursuing a more-or-less unified set of goals and projects (see Rovane (1998) ).
The role of others in all this is not to be underappreciated. Ross (this volume) makes a powerful case that that humans (like other animals) communicate and bargain non-linguistically using multiple analog signaling systems (think of the continuous variety of small facial and bodily motions that may convey pleasure or displeasure, or encouragement to approach or retreat). But when such agents are also able to label their own states and those of others (pinning them down, for example, as "attracted" or "un-attracted", "interested" or "not interested" and so on) they enter into a new kind of arena, one whose dynamics can be stabilized by a series of such all-or-nothing (digital) commitments. (These are achieved, for example, whenever one agent labels another's state and the other does not reject the label).
Further negotiations and co-ordinations among this group can then be predicated upon this stable base-line of publicly endorsed digital commitments. Ross depicts such practices as recursively agent-generating: that is to say, the agents that enter into the digitallymodulated negotiation (or other co-ordination project) are defined, in part, by these very sets of commitments, and the new utility functions that accompany them.
Despite all this we are prone, it seems, to a particularly dangerous kind of cognitive illusion. Because our best efforts at watching our own minds in action reveal only the conscious flow of ideas and decisions, we mistakenly identify ourselves with this stream of conscious awareness. Then, when in our more scientific moments we begin to enquire into the material and physical underpinnings of the mind and self, it can quickly seem as if much (though not all) of the brain and all the rest of the body, not to mention the surrounding social and technological webs, are just tools for that conscious user. This is the mistake that led Avicenna, the Islamic philosopher quoted at the start of the chapter, to depict his own bodily limbs as "no more than garments". But garments for what? A conscious Cartesian self perhaps? To pursue this route is to embrace a hideously disfigured image of the mind and self , privileging a vanishingly small piece of the true personal and cognitive pie.
A better bet, as we have already begun to see, is the de-centralized, distributed, heterogeneous vision of the machinery of mind and self powerfully championed by the philosopher Daniel Dennett (see especially Dennett (1991) spin to make sense of our actions, proclivities and projects.
According to Dennett, we are our own best story, and our sense of self is a kind of artifact, useful for many purposes, but best taken with a pinch of salt.
I shall not rehearse or critique Dennett's arguments here (though I have done so at some length elsewhere-see for example Clark (2002b) ). Instead, I simply note that our earlier reflections lead us to the very same conclusions, unpalatable though they may initially seem. There is no self, if by self we mean some central cognitive essence that makes me who and what I am. In its place there is just the "soft self": a rough-and-tumble control-sharing coalition of processes -some neural, some bodily, some technological -and an ongoing drive to tell a story, to paint a picture in which "I" am the central player.
Giving up on the image of a hard central self raises a thorny problem.
What, then, makes a grab-bag of tools (a grab-bag whose specific elements may shift and change over time) into a unified, cohesive self? Part of the answer, to be sure, is that we simply hallucinate more unity and cohesion than in fact exists. Related to this is the pragmatic point that for many social and legal purposes, it is convenient to simply identify the agent with the core biological ensemble. We imprison the body and brain, not the laptop! But we do this despite knowing that individual bits of neural circuitry (my hippocampus, let's say) are themselves as incapable of being 'guilty'
as the laptop! What we are really doing is rejecting a pattern of behaviour that has itself emerged from a whole social and biotechnological matrix.
But another, perhaps more interesting, part of the answer is that the unity and cohesion of the self, and the distinctness of the self (the sense we have of being individual agents, located thus-and-so, suspect, when on the basis of such information a loose-knit system begins to stabilize itself and to actively protect its own problemsolving infra-structure.
Thus reflect on the (superficially disproportionate) vexation of the child whose parents enter and slightly re-arrange her bedroom when she is not around. The feeling is one of almost personal assault. The room, organized in a certain way, was integral to the child's modes of play and study. To borrow an even simpler example, most of us keep our drinking glasses in a certain cupboard in the house. By actively stabilizing this environmental structure (putting clean glasses back in that same cupboard) we simplify the problem of future glass-location.
Or consider the way files are arranged and stored in your own office.
Our offices are organized in highly individual ways, dovetailed to our specific needs and to our different neuro-biological profiles We human beings actively organize our own local environments for cognitive purposes, and then take steps to protect this achieved organization (woe to the cleaner who disturbs the piles). Again and again we act so as to stabilize our local environments in ways that simplify or enhance the problem-solving that needs to be done. All this is a close cousin, I claim, to our carefully constructed and defended notion of a bounded self. The narrative-spinning drive (clearly evidenced in well-known studies of the tendency towards confabulation -see e.g. Nisbett and Ross (1980) economy. Some of these may be simple forward models of the dynamics of bodily sub-systems (see eg Miall and Wolpert (1996) , Clark and Grush (1999) ), while others may be more tightly woven with systems for episodic memory and for categorization.
In all cases, though, the self-governance works only because it is delicately and continuously keyed to (and often highly exploitative of) a variety of sources of order inherent in the rest of the system. True (flexible, efficient, robust) self-governance thus positively requires, or so I want to suggest, the use of 'soft' ecological control strategies:
ones that are maximally exploitative of the order and intelligence that is distributed throughout the larger system. This suite of soft, v For discussion of the impact of such differences on the arguments for the 'extended mind', see Adams and Aizawa (2001), Clark (2005) .
vi Dennett might seem to reject this claim, as when he writes that "we cannot draw the line separating our conscious mental states from our unconscious mental states" (1991, p.447 viii I am thinking here of the empirical evidence (though see section 4 above) to suggest that our chosen actions are frequently the results of unconscious activity that precedes the experience of conscious will. See e.g. Libet (1985) , and more recent demonstrations such as Wegner (2002) . For an interesting review, see Haggard (2005) .
ix Indeed, Ismael notes that the contrast between self-governing and selforganizing systems is 'not a dichotomy' and that 'most animate systems fall somewhere in the space between those with fixed and those with flexible response functions' (ms)
x One potentially important difference is that Ismael thinks that the relation of true dynamical coupling, in which 'controller' (ecological or otherwise) and 'controlled' are engaged in a continuous reciprocal exchange, introduces important complexities and undermines the attempt to couch the relation in quite those terms. The notion of an ecological controller, Ismael might object, implies a kind of divisibility that ongoing coupled influence (between self-model and whole embodied system) cannot underwrite. Thus she writes that in such cases "there is no simple way to decompose the system into dynamically separable units" (ms p.10) For my own part, I don't yet see why this makes a significant difference. For the roles of the parts seem distinct enough, even if their ongoing co-evolution resists decomposition. For example, one part of the system may have access to stored memories and a self-profile while another, though constantly coupled to it, does not.
xi For something like this vision of multiple partial models as a mode of control, see Arbib (1993 ) 
